From: [redacted]
Sent: Wednesday, December 08, 2010 4:03 PM
To: 2-2 AVN Staff; 2-2 ASLT COs; 2-2 ASLT 1SGs
Subject: FW: Wikileaks data on Gov’t Computers & Personal Owned
Computers (UNCLASSIFIED)
Importance: High

ALCON,

Below is the guidance for viewing material on Wikileaks’ website.  To
summarize the below, the Wikileaks website is not to be viewed on a
Government computer, the information is still considered to be
classified and any computer found containing classified information
(i.e. information from Wikileaks) will confiscated and subsequently
wiped.

If there are any questions please contact the S2 office.

v/r

[redacted]
CPT, MI
2-2 AASLT BN S2

—–Original Message—–
From: [redacted]
Sent: Wednesday, December 08, 2010 11:05 AM
To: [redacted]
Subject: Wikileaks data on Gov’t Computers & Personal Owned Computers
(UNCLASSIFIED)
Importance: High

BLUF: Do not view released or published classified data found on the
internet (Open Source) on unclassified Government systems OR on personal
owed systems. (See caveats)

Department of the Army policies regarding the issue can be found in AR
380-5 Information Security and AR 25-2 Information Assurance. All of the
information is still considered classified. Although now that it can be
found via open source, DOD still considers it as classified until
further notice and should not be viewed or process on a designated
unclassified government computer. Should a unclassified computer be
found containing classified information, it will need to be isolated and
wiped to remove the information.

As for viewing the information via personal computer, I have not seen
any official message traffic preventing military personnel from viewing
the information; however should a personal laptop be found with
classified information on it, it will be confiscated with the potential
for a 15-6 investigation based on the information on an unapproved
system and improper storage.

AR 380-5, Chapter 10-2 a.

and

AR 25-2

4-31. Employee-owned information systems a. Prohibit the use of
employee-owned information systems (EOISs) for classified or sensitive
information.

AR 25-2 Chapter 3-3

c. General users. Use of Government IS and access to Government networks
is a revocable privilege, not a right.

Users are the foundation of the DiD strategy and their actions affect
the most vulnerable portion of the AEI. Users must have a favorable
background investigation or hold a security clearance and access
approvals commensurate with the level of information processed or
available on the system. Users will-

(1) Comply with the command’s AUP for Government owned ISs and sign an
AUP prior to or upon account activation.

(2) Complete initial and/or annual IA training as defined in the IA
training BBP (https://informationassurance.us.army.mil
<https://informationassurance.us.army.mil/> ).

(3) Mark and safeguard files, output products, and storage media per the
classification level and disseminate them only to individuals authorized
to receive them with a valid need to know.

(4) Protect ISs and IS peripherals located in their respective areas in
accordance with physical security and data protection requirements.

(5) Practice safe network and Internet operating principles and take no
actions that threaten the integrity of the system or network.

(6) Obtain prior approval for the use of any media (for example, USB,
CD-ROM, floppy disk) from the SA/ IAM.

(7) Scan all files, attachments, and media with an approved and
installed AV product before opening a file or attachment or introducing
media into the IS.

(8) Report all known or suspected spam, chain letters, and violations of
acceptable use to the SA, IAM, or IASO.

(9) Immediately stop using an infected IS; and report suspicious,
erratic, or anomalous IS operations, and missing or added files,
services, or programs to the SA/IASO in accordance with local policy.

(10) Not disclose their individual account password or pass-phrase
authenticators.

(11) Invoke password-protected screen locks on your workstation after
not more than 15 minutes of non-use or inactivity.

(12) Logoff ISs at the end of each workday.

(13) Access only that data, control information, software, hardware, and
firmware for which the user is authorized access.

(14) Access only that data that they are authorized or have a need to
know.

Should someone have additional information regarding this issue please
send to me so I can review and disseminate.

V/r,

CPT [redacted]
BDE S2, 2 CAB, 2 ID

I’ve redacted the names in the emails; what matters is that they came from the BDE and BN S2. For those of you not in the Army, the S2 is the information security office; the bit of each unit in charge of classification, and the officer who signs as S2 is the person in charge of information security for that unit.

The policy they lay out here actually seems pretty sane to me: even though they’re threatening confiscation and erasure of personal computers discovered to have classified data on them, it’s not like they’re proposing to audit everyone’s individual PC; they’re just reiterating already extant policy. As it stands, on your own time and internet you’re perfectly free to look at this; just turn on porn mode and prevent your browser from caching anything!

A video was posted recently by WikiLeaks. It’s gun camera footage from an Apache engagement on 12 July 2007.

The video begins with ground forces requesting support from Crazyhorse, the Apache flight. They mention a group of people, one of whom has a weapon.

It’s hard to see, because we’re looking at a low-resolution version of a low-resolution video looking at a distant target, but the guy does appear to be carrying an AK. It looks like the Apache’s found the group that the ground forces were talking about.

After identifying further members of the group, the Apaches requested and received permission to engage. Only after receiving permission did they first fire weapons. Once they had downed all targets, they stopped firing. They did not fire on the wounded. When a van arrived to evacuate the targets, they requested and received permission to engage. Only then did they disable the van.

Wikileaks is consistently referring to these men as ‘civilians.’ They may not have been uniformed military personnel, but they were definitely combatants; they may not have been currently actively engaged in a firefight, but there had been small arms fire from that area since before dawn that day. The mission of both the Apache element and the ground forces was to eliminate any insurgents and/or weapons caches from the area.

After the fact, it was discovered that two of the people killed were in fact Reuters employees, and that in the van were two children injured by the attack. Coverage of the video has focused on this. It’s tragic, but the newspeople were in the company of armed insurgents and appeared to be part of that group. As for the children, they were simply not detectable from the Apache.

It’s worth looking at the official report. (Local Cache) The results findings begin on page 11 of the PDF. The report contains necessary background information, such as the fact that the infantry less than 200 yards away had been receiving small-arms fire all morning.

There are plenty of people out there calling this a war crime, murder, and worse. That is simply not the case. There are people out there who recognize this (1, 2, 3), but they are too few.

War is a terrible thing, but this was not a crime. This was professional pilots reacting appropriately to a hostile situation. I feel sympathy for the noncombatants in the group, but they brought it upon themselves.

It is. Enter Secure Flight, the latest waste of time from the ever-useless TSA. Conceptually, it’s at least not counterproductive: they want to make the no-fly and extra screening watchlists more selective, by accounting for age and gender as well as name. However, they remain true to form by implementing the idea terribly.

Here’s the idea: every traveler must submit their full name, their date of birth, and their gender when purchasing a ticket. The airline collates a list of these and submits it to the TSA, where it is compared to the watchlists.

Here are the problems. First, no airline ticket purchasing system is designed to collect all of this information. That could be fixed, but the TSA is rolling out the program slowly on a per-airline basis with no advance notice or public oversight, requiring each of them to send these scammy-looking emails after the fact of purchase to collect this information without which the ticket becomes void.

Second, the filtering is done by computer, so it requires the traveler’s exact name. The problem here is that few if any people write their name exactly the same way on every document. I buy airline tickets using my first and last name. Some of my identification documents have my full middle name, some include just an initial. Sometimes, as in my upcoming flight, I won’t have any formal identification documents at all, just military leave paperwork. (Fun fact: I’ve flown to and from Korea three times so far with nothing more than an 8.5×11″ sheet of paper with a form and some scribbled signatures on it. Mine is authentic. The TSA has never actually verified that it was.) Plenty of people have more than three names. Designing the system such that it can be defeated by leaving out an initial renders it nearly useless.

Finally, if you’ve got my name, gender, and birth date, you’re halfway to stealing my identity. I am not comfortable surrendering this information to an organization that has reliably provided security theatre at the expense of actual security. To do much with a stolen identity, you also need at least part of a social security number; I suspect that anyone in a position to misuse the passenger information collected through this program will also have access to resources which can provide that.

Will I submit, and provide the TSA with everything it demands? Yes. Commercial flight is still the only option both fast enough to provide international travel within my leave time and cheap enough to be affordable. However, every time I fly within the US, I am more and more disinclined to ever repeat the experience.